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WHAT THE MISSISSIPPI PERSONHOOD 
AMENDMENT TELLS US ABOUT “LIFE” 
Caitlin E. Borgmann* 
“Personhood amendments,” which would define legal 
personhood as beginning at fertilization, appear to be gaining 
momentum in the United States. This November, Mississippi 
voters will decide whether to add the following provision to the 
Mississippi Constitution’s Bill of Rights: “Person defined. As used 
in this Article III of the state constitution, ‘The term “person” or 
“persons” shall include every human being from the moment of 
fertilization, cloning or the functional equivalent thereof.’”1 
The Amendment sounds extreme, and its potential 
consequences are indeed far-reaching.2 One useful purpose the 
proposed Amendment has served, however, is to shine a light on a 
time-worn mantra uttered in support of abortion restrictions, “Life 
begins at conception.” Religious leaders say it, politicians say it, 
members of the public say it. It has intuitive appeal, but what 
does it mean? This essay examines the ways in which defining 
legal personhood as beginning at fertilization helps bring to the 
fore a question that tends to lurk in the shadows of the abortion 
debate: the meaning of “life.” 
When most of us hear the word “life,” we instinctively think 
of our own lives or of the universal value of human life. 
Amendment 26 supporter Rebecca Kiessling claims she was 
“conceived in rape” and uses this to argue that women who become 
impregnated by their rapists should be forced to carry their 
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 1 Miss. Initiative 26 (2011) (proposed MISS. CONST. art. III, § 33), available at 
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections/Initiatives/Initiatives/Definition%20of%20Person-
PW%20Revised.pdf. 
 2 See infra p. 123. 
116 SUPRA [VOL. 81 
pregnancies to term.3 At a Mississippi College School of Law 
forum on Amendment 26, Kiessling exclaimed to the audience, “I 
love my life!”4 Undoubtedly she does. But what is the “life” that 
she loves? Kiessling is an educated woman with a family and a 
rewarding career. To every person in the audience, it must have 
been clear that Kiessling values much more than the simple 
biological fact that she is alive. Of course, life in this thick sense is 
not always rewarding. In fact, it may be difficult and dangerous. 
But such a life too is rich with successes and failures, pleasure 
and pain, moral and religious beliefs, commitments, aspirations, 
and family ties.5 A zygote or embryo clearly is not a “life” in this 
thick, multi-layered sense. It is alive, but only in the minimal, 
thin sense that it is an organism in the process—if all goes well6—
of developing into a person.7 
Clearly, then, a declaration that “life begins at conception” 
does not begin to answer the question of the moral value of a 
zygote, embryo, or fetus and how it should be treated under the 
law. Its use is a bait-and-switch maneuver that appeals to the 
thick versions of “life” that do not and cannot apply in the abortion 
context (except with respect to the woman’s life, which abortion 
rights opponents tend to ignore). “The unsurprising fact that an 
embryo or fetus is, biologically, ‘human life’ simply does not 
answer the moral (or legal) question whether and when that ‘life’ 
is to be accorded some or all of the rights of a person.”8 
                                                                                                         
 3 See Rebecca Kiessling, What Rape Exceptions Really Mean, REBECCA KIESSLING, 
http://www.rebeccakiessling.com/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 4 See Rebecca Kiessling, Speaker at Mississippi College School of Law Symposium: 
Amendment 26—Exploring the Implications of Mississippi’s Personhood Initiative (Oct. 
25, 2011) (video recording on file with Mississippi College School of Law). 
 5 Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion 
Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 593 (2009). 
 6 While abortion or some forms of contraception may interfere with a zygote’s 
journey toward birth, so may the normal process of in vitro fertilization and stem cell 
research. Even absent these interferences, a zygote or embryo has fairly low odds of 
developing into a person; studies suggest that up to fifty percent or more of all embryos 
are spontaneously aborted, most without the woman even knowing it. See John C. 
Petrozza, M.D., Recurrent Early Pregnancy Loss, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/260495-overview. 
 7 See generally Borgmann, supra note 5 (distinguishing between “thick” and “thin” 
notions of “life” and arguing that conservatives trade on the thick versions of life in 
opposing abortion, while actually employing the term only in its thin sense). 
 8 Borgmann, supra note 5, at 555. 
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Amendment 26 addresses this question head-on, contending that 
legal and moral personhood exists at fertilization.9 The 
amendment therefore provides occasion to consider whether such 
a position is, not just a sincere belief, but consistent with the 
considered judgments of those who profess it as well as with 
public reason.10 
The supporters of Amendment 26 have described it as a 
measure aimed at outlawing abortion.11 They claim as their goal 
to “challenge Roe-v-Wade at it’s [sic] very core.”12 They have 
tended to dismiss any discussion of broader ramifications as “fear-
mongering.”13 Some have argued, even as to abortion, that the 
amendment is not self-executing but only makes a policy 
statement in favor of embryonic personhood,14 an interpretation 
that would surely surprise the many voters who apparently view 
the amendment as an abortion ban. 
                                                                                                         
 9 See Miss. Initiative 26 (2011) (proposed MISS. CONST. art. III, § 33), available at 
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections/Initiatives/Initiatives/Definition%20of%20Person-
PW%20Revised.pdf. 
 10 See Borgmann, supra note 5, at 554-55. 
 11 See Amendment 26: Why?, PERSONHOOD MISSISSIPPI, 
http://personhoodmississippi.com/amendment-26/why.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., Terri Herring, PRO: Constitution should define life at conception, 
CLARION LEDGER (Oct. 16, 2011), http://beta.clarionledger.com/article/ 
20111016/OPINION03/110160302/1046; The TRUTH About VOTING YES on Initiative 
26: What Mississippi Personhood Will and Will Not Do, PRO-LIFE MISS., 
http://www.prolifemississippi.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). Their rhetoric conceals a 
sleight of hand, however. The proponents claim the amendment “WILL NOT outlaw 
any contraceptives,” but they label the implicated types of contraception as abortion, 
referring to them as “chemicals and devices that kill the tiniest boys and girls after 
fertilization.” Id. Similarly, they claim the measure “WILL NOT end in vitro 
fertilization,” while condemning practices that are an integral part of the IVF process. 
Id.; see also Michelle Goldberg, Will Mississippi Ban IVF, U.S. POLITICS (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/10/24/personhood-ballot-initiative-in-
mississippi-could-ban-some-ivf-practices.html. 
 14 See, e.g., Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1267 (Miss. 2011) (Randolph, J., 
concurring) (proponents argue that the amendment “proposes no new right, . . . 
modifies no existing right, and . . . repeals no portion of the existing Bill of Rights.”); 
Michael J. New, Personhood in Mississippi, THE CORNER (Sept. 14, 2011 2:54 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/277111/personhood-mississippi-michael-j-new 
(claiming amendment is not self-executing); cf. Christopher R. Green, A Textual 
Analysis of the Possible Impact of Measure 26 on the Mississippi Bill of Rights, 81 MISS. 
L.J. SUPRA 39, 41 (2011) (claiming that the amendment might not prohibit abortion on 
its own). 
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Regardless, the wording of the amendment reaches far 
beyond abortion, describing all fertilized human eggs as “persons” 
entitled to protection under Mississippi’s Bill of Rights. To 
eliminate any question about broader ramifications, the drafters 
simply could have tailored the amendment to abortion. But they 
chose not to. Indeed, the supporters claim that, “[i]f 
Mississippians vote Yes on Amendment 26, all human beings 
would be ensured equal rights in our state [and] protection under 
law - regardless of their size, location or developmental stage.”15 
That the amendment is placed in the Mississippi Constitution’s 
Bill of Rights, rather than the preamble or some other section,16 
seemingly has some significance.17 As the supporters recognize, 
the amendment is essentially an equal protection clause for 
fertilized eggs and the unborn. 
The amendment’s meaning and legal effect will ultimately 
have to be determined by the Mississippi courts. In 1989, the 
Supreme Court left it to the Missouri courts to decode a similar-
sounding statutory provision challenged in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.18 That provision, found in the 
preamble to Missouri’s omnibus abortion law, included the state 
legislature’s “findings” that “[t]he life of each human being begins 
at conception,” and that “[u]nborn children have protectable 
interests in life, health, and well-being.”19 It also required that 
Missouri law 
be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the 
unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities available to other persons, 
citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the 
Constitution of the United States, and decisional 
interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court 
                                                                                                         
 15 Amendment 26: Why?, supra note 11. 
 16 Cf. MISS. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of Mississippi in convention assembled, 
grateful to Almighty God, and invoking his blessing on our work, do ordain and 
establish this constitution.”). 
 17 Cf. Oktibbeha Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585, 588 (Miss. 1988) 
(“When a constitutional provision grants a distinct right, the provision is self-executing 
and requires no legislation to effectuate it.”). 
 18 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 19 MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1999). 
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and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and 
constitution of this state.20 
Missouri disavowed the apparently sweeping implications of 
this provision, arguing that it was merely “precatory and 
impose[d] no substantive restrictions on abortions.”21 The 
Supreme Court deferred to this interpretation, noting that “[t]he 
preamble [could] be read simply to express [a] value judgment” 
and that the Missouri courts alone had the authority to read it 
more broadly.22 
Amendment 26 on its face grants zygotes and embryos 
personhood status only under the Mississippi Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights. The Mississippi Supreme Court could interpret 
Amendment 26 to state only a policy position or “value judgment” 
favoring legal equality for embryos that has no direct legal effect. 
But this seems difficult given the provision’s unequivocal wording 
and its placement in the Bill of Rights.23 Or the court could 
construe the provision to apply only to protections found expressly 
in the Bill of Rights, thus leaving undisturbed the meaning of 
“person” under statutes that do not implicate the Bill of Rights.24 
In order to conclude that, however, the court would have to find 
that the Mississippi Bill of Rights encompasses no equality 
protection (for example through its due process clause), a ruling 
that one would imagine might be politically and normatively 
unpalatable.25 
                                                                                                         
 20 Id. § 1.205.2. 
 21 Webster, 492 U.S. at 505. 
 22 Id. at 506. The Court did implicitly acknowledge, however, that the language of 
the preamble would bear this broader interpretation. See id. (“It will be time enough 
for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to 
restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way.”). 
 23 See, e.g., Oktibbeha Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585, 588 (Miss. 
1998). 
 24 See Green, supra note 14, at 42. 
 25 Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying equal protection principles 
to federal government through Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); 2 ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 20-27 (G. Alan Tarr 
& Robert F. Williams eds., 2006); Jeffrey A. Parness, American State Constitutional 
Equalities, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 773 (2009) (describing widespread protection of equality in 
state constitutions). The Mississippi Supreme Court apparently has not expressly 
addressed this question, although litigants have frequently asserted, and several 
opinions imply, that the due process clause of the Mississippi Constitution 
encompasses equal protection. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Jackson, 665 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 
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More important, we should consider why anyone would strain 
to give the amendment such limited scope. If the amendment’s 
language is taken at face value, then it makes no normative sense 
to limit its impact.26 This amendment forthrightly takes the 
position that we so often hear abortion proponents asserting: that 
human life has the same moral significance at the moment of 
conception as it does when a person is born. A limited construction 
of the amendment is in fact a denial of its premise, and we should 
recognize it as such.27 
The standard liberal response to the assertion that “life 
begins at conception,” however, recoils from such recognition. The 
liberal approach maintains that it is fine for people to hold that 
belief, but impermissible for them to impose it on everyone else.28 
Liberals consider this approach respectful because it does not 
doubt the sincerity of anyone’s belief.29 Indeed, it does not address 
the content of the belief at all, and this is precisely the problem. 
The liberal approach does not really take the claim seriously. It 
tells the holder of this belief to keep it under wraps. To a person 
who believes that an embryo is a person, that is insulting. It is 
akin to saying a person must keep to herself the belief that people 
on death row, or the elderly, are people. The position that 
personhood begins at conception, if taken at face value, is non-
negotiable; if valid, it must be imposed on society. A serious moral 
conversation on abortion therefore demands that we examine the 
consistency of the premise that personhood begins at fertilization. 
                                                                                                         
1995) (referring to state equal protection and appearing to address equal protection 
argument on the merits); Barnwell, Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., 162 So. 2d 635, 641 (Miss. 1964) 
(“We do not believe the appellants have been denied due process of law and equal 
protection of the laws under the Constitutions of the State and Federal 
Governments.”); Brief for Appellant, Goldsby v. State, 123 So. 2d 429, 431 (Miss. 1960) 
(No. 41547), 1960 Miss. LEXIS 488, at *9 (counsel argued that “the trial court denied to 
appellant equal protection of the laws, and deprived the appellant of a fair trial in 
violation of the provisions of the 14th amendment to the United States, and of article 3, 
section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890”). 
 26 See Jonathan F. Will, Op-Ed., Life and Law – The Commitment to Pre-Embryonic 
Personhood, MISS. BUS. J. (Sept. 23, 2011), http://msbusiness.com/2011/09/op-ed-life-
and-law-%E2%80%94%C2%A0the-commitment-to-pre-embryonic-personhood/. 
 27 See Borgmann, supra note 5, at 573. 
 28 Id. at 573 & n.106. 
 29 Id. at 572-73. 
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To be fair to their opponents, abortion rights supporters need to 
grapple with this question. 
And to be fair, abortion rights opponents need to grapple with 
it too. Too often, they meet demands for clarity and consistency 
with indignation and a refusal to engage in the conversation.30 
Upon closer examination, however, a person who asserts that “life 
begins at conception” generally does not seem to mean that legal 
personhood begins at conception. Often people making this claim 
have simply not thoroughly contemplated whether that is what 
they mean, and on reflection they seem uncomfortable with the 
idea. A journalist’s interviews of anti-abortion protestors in 
Libertyville, Illinois, in 2007 revealed that many had not even 
contemplated the possibility that a woman should be punished for 
obtaining an illegal abortion.31 When pressed, most did not feel 
that she should be punished, even though they claimed that 
abortion was “murder.”32 
Many who oppose abortion rights implicitly reject embryonic 
or fetal personhood, although they rarely say so explicitly. Michael 
J. New, for example, writes in the National Review Online that: 
Personhood Amendments place the pro-life movement on 
some very difficult political terrain. They force pro-life 
activists to publicly oppose abortion in some of the most 
difficult cases including rape, incest, and life of the mother. 
They also effectively require pro-life activists to support the 
banning — not just the defunding — of embryonic stem cell 
research. They might also require pro-lifers to oppose in vitro 
fertilization. 
Collectively, this is a tough sell. All in all, while most 
Americans disapprove of abortion on demand — they do tend 
to think abortion should be a legal option in hard case 
circumstances.33 
While New himself may not endorse the idea that “abortion should 
be a legal option” in hard cases, his objection to personhood 
                                                                                                         
 30 See id. at 585, 601-02. 
 31 AtCenterNetwork, Libertyville Abortion Demonstration, YOUTUBE (July 30, 
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk6t_tdOkwo. 
 32 Id. 
 33 New, supra note 14. 
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amendments as a poor strategy for opposing abortion suggests he 
does not believe that zygotes and embryos are morally equivalent 
to persons.34 Otherwise, regardless how hard the strategy, it 
would be morally problematic to support anything else. 
The 2012 Republican presidential candidates have struggled 
with this tension. In particular, many have wanted to describe 
abortion as a “states’ rights” issue, a position that is incompatible 
with a view that embryos have the same moral status as 
persons.35 For example, Minnesota Congresswoman Michelle 
Bachmann has said, “I am 100 percent pro-life from conception to 
natural death,” but has also declared that abortion is a “state 
issue” and suggested she might support incremental restrictions.36 
Former Godfather’s Pizza CEO Herman Cain tried to reassure 
voters that he was “100% pro-life. End of story,” after maintaining 
in an interview that “abortion should be left to women and their 
families . . . .”37 In an interview, former Massachusetts Governor 
Mitt Romney declared his belief that “life begins in conception” 
but also said, “My view is that the Supreme Court should reverse 
Roe v. Wade and send back to the states the responsibility for 
deciding whether [abortion] is legal or not.”38 Texas Governor Rick 
Perry has waffled between declaring abortion a states’ rights issue 
and stating his support for a federal constitutional amendment 
banning abortion.39 
Amendment 26, at least on its face, seems prone to no such 
ambiguity. And its supporters appear to embrace the view that 
embryos are morally the same as persons. They state that, under 
the amendment, “all human beings would be ensured equal rights 
in our state & protection under law - regardless of their size, 
                                                                                                         
 34 Id. 
 35 See Borgmann, supra note 5, at 583. 
 36 Craig Robinson, Bachmann on Late Term Abortion Bans: “That’s a State Issue,” 
THE IOWA REPUBLICAN, Oct. 17, 2011, http://theiowarepublican.com/2011/bachmann-
on-late-term-abortion-bans-%E2%80%9Cthat%E2%80%99s-a-state-issue%E2%80%9D/. 
 37 Catalina Camia, Herman Cain Clarifies Abortion Stance, USA TODAY ON 
POLITICS (Oct. 20, 2011 2:42 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
onpolitics/post/2011/10/herman-cain-homosexuality-abortion-cnn-interview-/1. 
 38 Maggie Haberman, Romney Talks Abortion with Huckabee, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 
2011 10:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/64902.html. 
 39 Ed Kilgore, The Hypocrisy of “States’ Rights” Conservatives, SALON (Aug. 7, 2011 
9:01 AM), http:www.salon.com/2011/08/07/Kilgore_states_rights/. 
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location or developmental stage.”40 That statement forthrightly 
expresses the view that, once a human egg is fertilized by a 
human sperm, the resulting union immediately yields a person of 
the exact same moral status as you and me. The implications of 
this position, of course, are astonishing. Some forms of 
contraception, such as emergency contraceptive pills and IUDs, 
would be impermissible. So would in vitro fertilization as 
currently practiced. Women’s pregnancies would have to be 
policed to ensure that women did not criminally endanger or kill 
their embryos or fetuses through their conduct. Medical providers 
caring for pregnant women might have to give equal regard to the 
fetus’s life in choosing treatment options even where the woman’s 
life was in danger. Laws far outside the reproductive sphere, 
including those affecting inheritance, census-taking, and 
apportionment would arguably be implicated. 
One would imagine that nearly everyone would find these 
consequences ultimately untenable.41 This is not simply because 
people want in vitro fertilization or contraception for selfish 
reasons, or otherwise feel that their self-interests are in jeopardy. 
It is because equating a zygote or embryo with a fully developed 
human being simply does not fit our considered judgments about 
the meaning of personhood and “life” in its thick sense. Any 
person who doubts this would do well to try this helpful thought 
experiment:42 Imagine a fertility clinic is burning, and you happen 
to be standing outside. When you rush in to help, you see a toddler 
sitting on the floor crying and a tray of 100 frozen embryos in a 
freezer. You could manage to grab and rescue one or the other, but 
not both. Which would you choose? 
The way in which Amendment 26 highlights these issues no 
doubt causes some discomfort to mainstream abortion rights 
                                                                                                         
 40 Amendment 26: Why?, supra note 11. 
 41 See, e.g., Jen Chung, Mississippi Personhood Law Proposes To Make Abortion, 
Birth Control, IVF Illegal, GOTHAMIST (Oct. 26, 2011, 5:37 PM), 
http://gothamist.com/2011/10/26/latest_threat_to_womens_right_to_ch.php (describing 
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Johnny DuPree as voicing support for Amendment 
26 and stating, “[m]y daughter who we didn’t abort has a 4-year-old son. He is an in 
vitro baby.”). 
     42 See George J. Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., Nov.−Dec. 1989, at 20, 22 (attributing this hypothetical to Dr. Leonard Glantz of 
Boston University School of Public Health). 
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opponents like the National Right to Life Committee.43 But it is a 
conversation that should no longer be avoided by either side of the 
debate. If abortion rights opponents prefer to support restrictions 
less extreme than this measure, they should first admit that, 
while an embryo has moral value,44 it is not equivalent to a fully 
developed human. Moreover, they must be able to explain why 
they support or tolerate abortion in some contexts but not 
others.45 And abortion rights supporters must insist on these 
explanations. A far more meaningful and honest public debate 
could then be had about whether and when abortion and other 
reproductive health services should be permitted. So far, it has 
been almost impossible to get either side to engage in this 
conversation. If nothing else, we can hope that Amendment 26 
helps to make that happen. 
                                                                                                         
 43 See Erik Eckholm, Push for ‘Personhood’ Amendment Represents New Tack in 
Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/us/politics/personhood-amendments-would-ban-
nearly-all-abortions.html (“[T]raditional leaders of the [anti-abortion] fight, including 
National Right to Life and the Roman Catholic bishops, have refused to promote 
[personhood amendments], charging that the tactic is reckless and could backfire.”). 
 44 Most, but not all, would ascribe a higher moral value to a human embryo than 
other kinds of cells. And most likely accept a gradualist view of the moral value of 
human life that sees it as important but much less weighty at conception than at the 
very end of pregnancy, when it approaches and eventually equals the value of born 
persons. See Borgmann, supra note 5, at 602. Of course, there is undoubtedly 
widespread variation even within these parameters. This is a conversation that is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but it does help to show why an absolutist position that 
forces everyone to assume personhood from the time of fertilization offends the dignity 
of each person to form his or her own moral views on the topic. Id. 
 45 Id. at 585. 
